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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
All parties involved in this appeal are identified in the caption. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)0). 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the trial court properly hold that Jennie Nordgren "made a claim" 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11, by serving a notice of intent? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's statutory interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 
30-2-11 is reviewed for correctness. S.C, 1999 UT App. 251 at ^ 8. 
Issue 2: Did the trial court properly dismiss Plaintiff Chad Nordgren's loss of 
consortium claim when he served his notice of claim fifteen (15) months after Jennie 
Nordgren served her notice of intent? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's statutory interpretation of Utah Code Ann § 
30-2-11 and the trial court's ruling on Appellee's Motion to dismiss are reviewed for 
correctness. S.C, 1999 UT App. 251 at f 8; Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 
2004 UT 101, 104P.3d 1226. 
Issue 3: Did the trial court properly hold that the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act, applies to Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium claim, which allegedly arose out of 
health care provided to his spouse? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's statutory interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-3-401 et seq. and Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11 is reviewed for correctness. S.C v. 
Anderson, 1999 UT App. 251, f 8, 987 P.2d 611. 
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CONSTITUIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-401 etseq. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case: 
Plaintiff Chad Nordgren appealed from Judge Wallace A. Lee's July 28, 2009, 
Memorandum Decision and Order, which granted Dr. Blomquist's Motion to Dismiss 
Mr. Nordgren's claim for loss of consortium. 
2. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below: 
On June 12, 2007, Jennie Nordgren served Dr. Jeffrey Brown, Dr. Roger D. 
Blomquist, and the Sevier Valley Family Clinic with a notice of intent, and, thereby, 
began her medical malpractice action. (R. at 3, 20, 36-37, 123-124). Jennie Nordgren 
alleged that Defendants negligently failed to timely diagnose her colorectal cancer. (R. at 
36-37). 
Jennie Nordgren5s husband, Plaintiff Chad Nordgren, was not named as a party in 
the underlying medical malpractice action and did not assert any loss of consortium 
claims during discovery. (R. at 64-67). On September 11, 2008, however, Chad 
Nordgren sent a notice of claim to counsel for Defendants indicating, for the first time, 
that he wished to pursue a claim for loss of consortium. (R. at 37-38). Four days later, on 
September 15, 2008, Mr. Nordgren filed his Complaint and Jury Demand with the Sixth 
viii 
Judicial District Coiirt seeking damages for loss of consortium arising out of the medical 
care and treatment thai Defendants provided ;»> Jamie Nuidgiui. \ K. ai I u). 
Dt: 1:51,0! i iqi list i: esponded to Mi Nordgrei i's Coi nplaint by filing a Motioi 1 to 
Dismiss, arguing that Chad Nordgren failed to timely commence his loss of consortium 
anion pursuant .1.. i oss 01 v onson:..;., • . . . : ; : . • *=:::,pi. . , : : M L ' ! ,..: 
Mr. Nordgren's actions were at odds with the legislature's clear intent and were 
prejudicial to all Defendants. (R. at 22). Dr. Brown and the Sevier Valley Family Clinic 
j •- i I. 
Chad Nordgren filed his ()pposition to the Motion 10 I hsmiss and argued that he 
IUKI u.neiy asserted In > los:> oi consortium Jmiri i>eean->c il-c 1 v<:v> ol ( on-^Mihnn , t, 
\ < • . I - \ n . >• ! i
 ! t - - • • M . • i 
"during the same timeframe" as Mrs. Nordgren's action. (K. .3^ 44 r Mr, Nordgren 
sougl it to ji istify fill lis argi in lei it by assei tii ig til i •• .-. L J A . - . : , ; : . * • • ) 
participate in his wife's prelitigation process under the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act, I Jtah Code Ann. § 78B-3-401 et seq.y because his loss of consortium claiin is a third 
f !1 • • i ' • ' * III, 
Dr. Blomqiiist filed his Reply supporting the Motion io 1 )ismiss. (R. 62-74 - I h\ 
1 • • M . l a n g u a g e t > • i . ... ; .... ; _ .a:i 
Care Malpractice Act to argue that Chad Nordgren's claims were governed by the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act and should have been made "at the t ime" that Jennie 
ix 
argued that, based upon Chad Nordgren's deposition and Jennie Nordgren's answers to 
discovery, Dr. Blomquist did not have notice of Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium 
claim and was prejudiced by Mr. Nordgren's failure to timely make his claim. (R. at 
71-73). 
Dr. Brown and Sevier Valley Family Clinic joined Dr. Blomquist's Reply arguing 
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over Mr. Nordgren's action because he failed 
to comply with the conditions precedent set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act. (R. at 108-111). 
Judge Lee issued a Memorandum Decision and Order dismissing Chad Nordgren's 
Complaint because he "failed to follow the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11." 
(R. 120-126). The trial court made the following findings: (1) that the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act applies to "Plaintiff and his loss of consortium claim because [his claim] 
arises out of injury to his spouse resulting from health care provided to her by 
Defendants;" (2) that in the medical malpractice context, beginning a malpractice action 
by filing a notice of intent to commence action, constitutes making a "claim" for 
purposes of the Loss of Consortium Act; (3) Chad Nordgren's claim was not "made at the 
time that the claim of the injured person [was] made" and was, therefore, untimely; and 
(4) that filing within the two year statute of limitations applicable to Jennie Nordgren's 
malpractice action, does "not meet the statutory requirements of [Utah Code Ann.] § 30-
2-11 and [Chad Nordgren's] loss of consortium claim should be dismissed." (R. at 123— 
x 
124). Chad Nordgren then tiled his Notice of Appeal and the Utah Supreme Court 
assigned this case to the I Jtah Court of Appeals. (R. at 128 129, 134). 
3- Staten lent of the f 'acts: 
In December 2005, Dr. Jeffrey Brown and the Sevier Valley Family Clinic 
pro. w^; nic.-div.al care and treatment h. * ,,,-,.= ^ i u g ; ^ ,, .^k;„ .:.,i!i,i /\o;dgrciL ; : r.'in 
which Dr. Brown believed was related to kidney stones. (R. at 1-2). According Dr. 
Brown ordered a CT scan to confirm this diagnosis. (R at 2), Dr Blomquist reviewed the 
C' I scai i o.f; IVft s 1 Jot dgren's abdoi i lei t and pelvis m • ; •; •• • VIi s. Not dgi en ha :! 
kidney stones. (R. at 2). Dr. Brown and the nursing staff at the Sevier Valley Family 
Clinic prescribed treatment for Mrs. Nordgren's kidney stones. (R. at 2-3). Jennie 
Nordgrei i w as later diagnosed "\ < • itl :t colorectal cancel (R at 3) 
On June 12, 2007, Mrs. Nordgren tiled and served each Defendant with a notice of 
intent to commence action and request toi picliligation p..nel review, pursuant to •:,-.• \ IM. 
Health Care Malpractice Act. (R. at 20, 37). Mrs. Nordgren alleged thai Dt. Hrou u i >r. 
Blomquist. and the Sevier Valley Fatnily Clinic acted negligent!*. In railing n> timeK 
commence action and the request for prelitigation panel review did not name Chad 
Nordgren as a party and did hui melius <m> oss o\ cwiiMMuuni uiinii. ik ui ..()). because 
an existing arbitration agreement uoverned her medical malpractice claim * H v •' 
of Professional Licensing dismissed Mrs. Nordgren's request for prelitigation panel 
review and tl le pai ties coi m i lenced arbiti atic i I. (R at 213, 3' 1 ). 
xi 
Mrs. Nordgren was the only Petitioner named in the arbitration. (R. at 64-67). 
During discovery, Mrs. Nordgren was asked in interrogatories to wC[s]tate specifically and 
in detail what causes of action [she was] claiming against these [Defendants and the 
basis for each claim." (R. at 64). In response, Mrs. Nordgren relied solely upon her notice 
of intent, which did not mention Chad Nordgren as a party or make a loss of consortium 
claim on his behalf. (R. at 64). During Jennie Nordgren's deposition, she asserted claims 
for medical expenses, travel expenses, and lost family income, but she did not assert any 
claims for or on behalf of Chad Nordgren for loss of consortium. (R. at 65). Chad 
Nordgren did not assert a claim for loss of consortium at the time of his deposition as a 
fact witness in Jennie Nordgren's arbitration. (R. at 65-67). When asked why he was not 
a party to Mrs. Nordgren's suit, he responded that he did not know. (R. at 65-67). 
On September 11, 2008, approximately fifteen (15) months after Jennie Nordgren 
first asserted her claims and causes of action, Chad Nordgren served each Defendant with 
a notice of claim indicating, for the first time, that he wished to assert a claim for loss of 
consortium and join in the arbitration. (R. at 67). Four days later on September 15, 2008, 
Mr. Nordgren filed a Complaint and Jury Demand with the Sixth Judicial District Court 
for loss of consortium arising out of medical care and treatment that Defendants provided 
to Jennie Nordgren. (R. at 1-6). On July 28, 2009, Judge Wallace A. Lee dismissed Mr. 
Nordgren's Complaint because he failed to timely commence his action pursuant to the 
Loss of Consortium Act and the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. (R. at 120-126). 
xii 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium 
claim for failure to fulfill the statutory requirements of the Loss of Consortium Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-2-11. Subsection (4)(a) requires a loss of consortium plaintiff to make 
his claim at the time the injured spouse makes her underlying injury claim. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(a). Jennie Nordgren made her claim on June 12, 2007, when she 
began her medical malpractice action by serving her notice of intent to commence action. 
Chad Nordgren, however, did not timely make his loss of consortium claim "at the time" 
that Jennie Nordgren began her medical malpractice suit. Instead, Mr. Nordgren asserted 
his loss of consortium claim fifteen months after Jennie Nordgren served her notice of 
intent and after the parties had performed substantial discovery. 
Subsection (4)(b) of the Loss of Consortium Act, requires that a loss of consortium 
claim derived from medical malpractice abide by to the provisions of the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act, including the filing of a notice of intent 90 days prior to 
commencing an action against a health care provider. Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(b). 
Chad Nordgren failed to fulfill these statutory requirements. This failure frustrated the 
purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act by not permitting the parties to 
effectively evaluate and possibly settle claims prior to litigation. 
Chad Nordgren failed to fulfill the statutory requirements of the Loss of 
Consortium Act. As a result, Dr. Blomquist did not have adequate notice of Chad 
Nordgren's loss of consortium claim. In addition, ChadNordgren improperly avoided the 
xiii 
requirements of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. These circumstances hindered Dr. 
Blomquist's ability to explore all claims that were asserted against him. Accordingly, the 
trial court properly dismissed Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium claim. Dr. Blomquist 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the ruling of the trial court. 
xiv 
ARGUMENT 
The Loss of Consortium Act, Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11, requires that a loss of 
consortium plaintiff make his claim at the time the injured person initially makes a claim, 
whether in a formal complaint, demand for arbitration, application for hearing, or notice 
of intent. The Loss of Consortium Act, states in pertinent part: 
A claim for the spouse's loss of consortium shall be: 
(a) made at the time the claim of the injured person is made and 
joinder of actions shall be compulsory; and 
(b) subject to the same defenses, limitations, immunities, and 
provisions applicable to the claims of the injured person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11(4) (emphasis added). Accordingly, when Chad Nordgren 
asserted his loss of consortium claim approximately fifteen months after Mrs. Nordgren 
served her notice of intent, the trial court appropriately dismissed his cause of action 
because he failed to fulfill the statutory requirements of the Loss of Consortium Act. (R. 
at 123). Specifically, (1) Chad Nordgren failed to make his claim at the time Jennie 
Nordgren made her claim by serving her notice of intent to begin her medical malpractice 
action, as required by subsection (4)(a) of the Loss of Consortium Act; and (2) Chad 
Nordgren failed to pursue his loss of consortium claim according to the provisions and 
limitations of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-401 et seq, 
as required by subsection (4)(b) of the Loss of Consortium Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 
30-2-1 l(4)(a), 30-2-1 l(4)(b). 
This Court reviews the trial court's statutory interpretation of the Loss of 
Consortium Act and the trial court's ruling on Dr. Blomquist's Motion to Dismiss for 
1 
correctness. See S C v. Anderson, 2009 UT App. 251, ^ [8, 987 P.2d 611, see also 
Oakwood Village LLC v Albertsons, Inc , 2004 UT 101 at 1(104, 104 P.3d 1226. 
I. The trial court properly dismissed Chad Nordgren's claim for loss of 
consortium for his failure to meet the statutory requirements of Utah Code 
Ann.§30-2-ll(4)(a). 
Subsection (4)(a) of the Loss of Consortium Act requires that a spouse's claim for 
"loss of consortium shall be . . . made at the time the claim of the injured person is made 
and joinder of actions shall be compulsory." Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(a). Plaintiff 
Chad Nordgren failed to fulfill this statutory requirement. 
a) The trial court properly held that Jennie Nordgren "made a claim" by 
serving a notice of intent. 
Jennie Nordgren began her medical malpractice claim against Defendants by filing 
a notice of intent on June 12, 2007, the trial court properly held that in doing so Jennie 
Nordgren "made a claim" for purposes of the Loss of Consortium Act. (R. at 123-124). 
The trial court recognized that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act defines "a claim" as 
a "medical malpractice action against a health care provider." (R. at 123). The trial court 
then noted that by serving a notice of intent on June 12, 2007, Jennie Nordgren began her 
medical malpractice action. (R. at 123).1 The trial court held that beginning a malpractice 
action constituted a "claim," for purposes of Utah Code § 30-2-11(4). (R. at 123-124). 
1
 Contrary to Mr. Nordgren's assertions, the trial court never held that a notice of intent to 
commence action "equals" a malpractice action under the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act. See Appellant's Brief at 8-12. Accordingly, this Court should disregard Mr. 
Nordgren's arguments that are based upon this premise. See Appellant's Brief at 8-12. 
2 
When construing legislative enactments, the court's primary objective is to give 
effect to the legislature's intent. See LPI Services v. McGee, 2009 UT 41 , 1J11, 215 P.3d 
135 (citing Savage v. Utah Youth Vill, 2004 UT 102, T[18, 104 P.3d 1242). To discern 
legislative intent, this Court should first look to the statute's plain language. See id. 
(citing Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 32 ffif 46, 164 P.3d 384). Courts 
must "read the plain language of the statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in 
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." See LPI Services, 
2009 UT at TI11. The trial court's holding follows the plain language of the Loss of 
Consortium Act and harmonizes its provisions with the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act. 
In order for the Loss of Consortium Act to be interpreted in harmony with the 
purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, service of a notice of intent must 
constitute "a claim." See Utah Code Ann. 30-2-1 l(4)(a). One of the primary purposes of 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is to give health care provider defendants notice of 
all claims and give the parties the opportunity to evaluate and discuss claims, defenses, 
and settlement potential prior to becoming locked into a lawsuit. See Behrens v. Raleigh 
Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-
402(3) (stating that the purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is to, in part, 
"expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims" (emphasis added)). To this end, the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act requires medical malpractice plaintiffs to serve a 
notice of intent and file a request for prelitigation panel review prior to filing a complaint. 
3 
See Plaits v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997); see also Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-3-412; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-416. 
The purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act are frustrated when a loss 
of consortium plaintiff fails to give notice of his claims at the time the medical 
malpractice plaintiff serves her notice of intent. When a defendant is not aware of all 
claims being made against it, it cannot effectively and accurately evaluate claims, 
defenses, and settlement potential. In this matter, Dr. Blomquist was not aware of Chad 
Nordgren's claims until September 2008, after Dr. Blomquist had engaged in substantial 
discovery regarding Jennie Nordgren's claims, including the depositions of both Jennie 
Nordgren and Chad Nordgren. Chad Nordgren's untimely assertion of his loss of 
consortium claim under these circumstances is precisely what the Loss of Consortium 
Act sought to avoid. 
Mr. Nordgren mistakenly argues that the Loss of Consortium Act requires that a 
party must file a formal complaint in order to make a claim. See Appellant's Brief at 8-
16. This argument is inconsistent with the language and intent of the governing statutes. 
The plain language of the Loss of Consortium Act is not as restrictive as Mr. Nordgren 
suggests. Had the legislature intended that a party could only make a claim by filing a 
formal complaint, it would have said as much. The legislature, however, chose much 
broader language that requires a loss of consortium claim to be "made at the time" of the 
underlying claim, which may be prior to litigation. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(a). 
Additionally, Chad Nordgren's proposed interpretation violates foundational rules of 
4 
statutory interpretation, which require, that whenever possible, a court interpret a statute 
by giving effect to each term and endeavor to interpret it in harmony with other statutes. 
See Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 485 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Utah 1971) (recognizing that 
the foundational rules of statutory interpretation require a court to "assume that each term 
was used advisedly; and that each [term] should be given an interpretation and 
application in accord with their usually accepted meaning"); see also Smith & Sons v. 
Utah Labor Commission, 2009 UT 19, If 7, 218 P.3d 580 (indicating that courts should 
interpret statutes in harmony with other statutes in the same and related chapters). 
Mr. Nordgren argues that subsection (4)(a) of the Loss of Consortium Act cannot 
be interpreted literally because doing so would deprive a loss of consortium plaintiff of 
his claim if his spouse resolved her claim outside of the judicial process. See Appellant's 
Brief at 12-16. Specifically, Mr. Nordgren argues that if the injured spouse resolved her 
claim outside of the judicial process, a loss of consortium plaintiff, could not make his 
claim at the same time or join his spouse's claim. Mr. Nordgren's argument, however, is 
premised upon the false assumption that in order to make "a claim," a party must file a 
formal complaint, which is inconsistent with the plain language and intent of both the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and the Loss of Consortium Act. See Appellant's Brief 
at 12-16. If a loss of consortium plaintiff makes his claim at the time that the injured 
spouse initially asserts her claim, whether in a formal complaint, notice of intent, or an 
application for hearing, then a loss of consortium plaintiff will not be deprived of his 
claim. Accordingly, this interpretation does not render the Loss of Consortium Act or any 
5 
poition thereof "void and/or inoperable" and does not lead to an absurd outcome as Mr. 
Nordgren argues. See Appellant's Brief at 13. Instead, this interpretation of the Loss of 
Consortium Act is in accordance with its plain language, fulfills the purposes of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act, and avoids duplicative claims and unnecessary costs. 
b) The trial court properly dismissed Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium 
claim, when he served his notice of claim fifteen months after Jennie 
Nordgren served her notice of intent. 
The plain language of the Loss of Consortium Act establishes that Chad Nordgren 
failed to timely make his claim when he served his notice of claim fifteen (15) months 
after Jennie Nordgren made her claim by serving a notice of intent. In fact, the Loss of 
Consortium Act states in relevant part: "A claim for the spouse's loss of consortium shall 
be . . . [mjade at the time the claim of the injured person is made and joinder of actions 
shall be compulsory." Utah Code Ann. 30-2-1 l(4)(a) (emphasis added). 
When reviewing the plain language of a statute, the foundational rules of statutory 
interpretation require a court to "assume that each term of a statute was used advisedly; 
and that each [term] should be given an interpretation and application in accord with their 
The trial court never held that Mr. Nordgren was required to file a formal 
complaint on June 12, 2007. But see Brief of Appellant at 12-16. In fact, because the trial 
court held that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was applicable to Mr. Nordgren's 
loss of consortium claim, requiring him to file a formal complaint on June 12, 2007, 
would be inconsistent with the trial court's holding and the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act. Instead, the trial court merely held that by serving his notice of claim fifteen (15) 
months after Jennie Nordgren began her claim and after the parties had engaged in 
substantial discovery, Chad Nordgren's did not timely assert his claim pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-2-11(4). (R. at 124). 
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usually accepted meaning." See Grant, 485 P.2d at 1036. The Loss of Consortium Act 
requires that a loss of consortium claim "shall be . . . made at the time the claim of the 
injured spouse is made." Utah Code Ann. 30-2-1 l(4)(a). Pursuant to the plain language of 
this statute, its "usually accepted meaning," and when interpreting this statute in harmony 
with other related chapters, a loss of consortium plaintiff must make his claim at the time 
that the injured party initially makes a claim, whether in a notice of intent, formal 
complaint, or even in an application for hearing before the labor commission. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(a); see also Diener v. Diener, 2004 UT App. 314, ^ 12, 98 P.3d 
1178 (noting "the use of the word 'shall' in a statute creates a mandatory condition"). If 
the statute were interpreted otherwise, a loss of consortium claim in medical malpractice 
cases, arbitrations, or workers compensation cases would inevitably lead to piece meal 
litigation, duplicative claims, and unnecessary costs. 
Chad Nordgren did not make his claims "at the time the claim of the injured 
person [was] made." Utah Code Ann. 30-2-1 l(4)(a). Instead, he made his claim for loss 
of consortium fifteen (15) months after Mrs. Nordgren made her claim. Accordingly, 
from June 2007 to September 2008, Dr. Blomquist was wholly unaware of Chad 
Nordgren's loss of consortium claim and proceeded to conduct discovery and case 
evaluations accordingly. (R. at 64-67). When Chad Nordgren served his notice of claim 
the parties had proceeded well into the factual discovery regarding Jennie Nordgren's 
claims. (R. at 67). Accordingly, Chad Nordgren's failure to timely make his claims at the 
time Jennie Nordgren filed her notice of intent is contrary to the plain language of the 
7 
Loss of Consortium Act and ultimately frustrates the purposes of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act to efficiently evaluate and settle claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-
402. 
Mr. Nordgren argues that the Loss of Consortium Act only requires that a loss of 
consortium claim is "filed in such a manner that allows a court (or arbitrator) to consider 
both the claims when making a decision." (R. at 41); see Appellant's Brief at 15. This 
argument, however, does not follow the foundational rules of statutory interpretation 
because it does not give weight to each term used in the statute. See Grant, 485 P.2d at 
1036. Mr. Nordgren's interpretation merely amounts to a mandatory joinder of loss of 
consortium claims and, thereby, ignores the first phrase of the statute, which requires that 
a loss of consortium claim shall be "made at the time the claim of the injured person is 
made." Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(a). Mr. Nordgren's interpretation conveniently 
subsumes any separate meaning inherent in "made at the time" into the statute's joinder 
requirement. Furthermore, if Mr. Nordgren's argument is taken to its logical conclusion, 
an underlying tort claim could proceed through fact and expert discovery then on the eve 
of arbitration the loss of consortium claimant could assert his claim for the first time, 
thereby, undermining the arbitration and the discovery process. 
Chad Nordgren alleges that pursuant to Crabtree v. Woodman, No. 2:06-CV-946-
TC, 2008 WL 4276957 (D. Utah, Sept. 11, 2008), and Buffer v. Kozitza, 75 N.W.2d 480 
(Minn. 1985), he has an independent right to bring a separate loss of consortium claim 
outside of Jennie Nordgren's arbitration. See Appellant's Brief at 12-16. Mr. Nordgren's 
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argument misses the mark. Whether or not Chad Nordgren can bring a separate claim for 
loss of consortium has never been at issue. Instead, at issue, is whether Chad Nordgren 
can appropriately assert his cause of action for loss of consortium by filing a notice of 
claim approximately fifteen months after Jennie Nordgren began pursuing her claims. 
Despite, Mr. Nordgren's attempt to construe Crabtree v. Woodman to address the 
timing of a loss of consortium claim, Crabtree v. Woodman, never addresses the "made at 
the time" requirement contained in the Loss of Consortium Act. See Crabtree v. 
Woodman, 2008 WL 4276957. Furthermore, Crabtree demonstrates the importance of 
both a medical malpractice plaintiff and the loss of consortium plaintiff jointly engaging 
in evaluations and settlement negotiations prior to litigation. See id. at *3-4. In Crabtree, 
Ms. Crabtree settled her claim. See id. at *2. Mr. Crabtree later requested settlement of his 
claim and the defendant argued that the integration clause of the settlement agreement 
applied to both the injury and the loss of consortium claims. The Utah district court held 
that Ms. Crabtree's release did not release Mr. Crabtree's separate loss of consortium 
claim, which could be pursued and tried separately. See id. at *5. Because a loss of 
consortium is a separate claim that a plaintiff can pursue separately in litigation if the 
underlying injury claim settles, then a health care practitioner defendant must be aware of 
both claims when the medical malpractice plaintiff files a notice of intent. To hold 
otherwise, would disregard the purpose and the importance of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act's prelitigation process and purpose to facilitate early assessment and 
resolution of claims were appropriate. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-402. 
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Mr. Nordgren relies upon the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding in Buffer v. 
Kozitza, 375 N.W.2d 480, 482 (Minn. 1985), to argue that he timely and appropriately 
asserted his claim in September 2008, by filing a formal complaint with the Sixth District 
Court. See Appellant's Brief at 14-16. Mr. Nordgren's reliance is misplaced. The Huffier 
court examines an automobile accident case, which is not subject to Utah's unique Loss 
of Consortium Act or the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. See id. at 481. Although the 
Minnesota loss of consortium statute contains a mandatory joinder requirement, it does 
not contain any requirement that the loss of consortium claim shall be "made at the time 
the claim of the injured person is made" or a requirement that the loss of consortium 
claim is subject to the provision and limitations of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
See id. at 482; see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11(4). Accordingly, although Justice Tena 
Campbell relied on Huffier in a Utah automobile accident case, Huffier is not applicable to 
this Court's delermination. See Crabtree, 2008 WL 4276957, *5. 
Jennie Nordgren made her claim when she began her medical malpractice action 
on June 12, 2007, by serving a notice of intent. By serving a notice of claim and filing his 
complaint fifteen (15) months later, in September 2008, Chad Nordgren did not timely 
make his claim "at the time the claim of the injured person [was] made." See Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(a). The trial court, therefore, properly held that Mr. Nordgren failed to 
fulfill the statutory requirements of the Loss of Consortium Act and properly dismissed 
his loss of consortium claim. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the ruling of the trial 
court on this basis. 
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II. The trial court properly dismissed Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium claim 
for his failure to meet the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-
ll(4)(b) by failing to comply with the provisions of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. 
Subsection (4)(b) of the Loss of Consortium Act requires that a spouse's claim for 
"loss of consortium shall be . . . subject to the same defenses, limitation, immunities, and 
provisions applicable to the claims of the injured person." Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-
1 l(4)(b). Plaintiff Chad Nordgren failed to fulfill this statutory requirement by failing to 
abide by the provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. Whether the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act applies to Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium claim is a 
matter of statutory interpretation that is reviewed for correctness. See S.C, 1999 UT App. 
at f 8. When interpreting a statute, a court must "first look to the plain language of the 
statute and give effect to that language unless it is ambiguous. Only where that language 
is ambiguous [does a court] consult other sources for meaning." Progressive Casualty 
Ins. Co. v. Ewart, 2007 UT 52, U 16, 167 P.3d 1011. 
a) The plain language of the Loss of Consortium Act establishes that the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is applicable to Chad Nordgren's loss 
of consortium claim. 
Pursuant to the statutory definition of a loss of consortium claim, the defenses, 
immunities, and provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act are applicable to 
Chad Nordgren's claim for loss of consortium. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(b). The 
Loss of Consortium Act expressly directs that a loss of consortium claim is "subject to 
the same defenses, limitations, immunities, and provisions applicable to the claims of the 
injured person." Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(b) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that 
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"the injured person" in this matter is Jennie Nordgren, and that her malpractice action is 
subject to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. (R. at 1-6, 44). 
Accordingly, Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium is, likewise, subject to the 
defenses, limitations, immunities, and provisions contained in the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, which include, among other things, the statutory requirement to serve a 
notice of intent 90 days prior to service of a complaint. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-2-
11(7), 78B-3-412; see also Carter v. Milford Valley Memorial Hospital, 2000 UT App. 
21, |^ 13, 996 P.2d 1076 (acknowledging the Medical Malpractice Act's mandatory 
preconditions to litigation). Mr. Nordgren failed to serve a notice of intent to commence 
action, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-412. (R. at 36-38, 44-46). The trial court, 
therefore, properly dismissed for Mr. Nordgren's failure to abide by the statutory 
requirements of the Loss of Consortium Act. 
b) The plain language of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act establishes 
that it applied to Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium claim. 
Pursuant to the plain language of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Chad 
Nordgren's loss of consortium claim is a wCmalpractice action against a health care 
provider." See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-403(16). Defendants are "health care providers" 
and it is undisputed that Jennie Nordgren's medical malpractice claim is a "malpractice 
action against a health care provider." (R. at 44); see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-403(12); 
see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-403(16). A loss of consortium claim is a derivative 
cause of action because "it arose out of or was occasioned by an injury to the spouse." 
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Hackfordv. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1290 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., 
dissenting). A loss of consortium claim, however, is also "an action for direct injury to 
the plaintiff spouse who no longer has the marital benefits of society, comfort, and 
protection." Id. 
Chad Nordgren's action for loss of consortium is derived from Jennie Nordgren's 
"medical malpractice action against a health care provider." (R. at 1-5). A "malpractice 
action against a health care provider" is defined as: 
any action against a health care provider whether in contract, 
tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based 
upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising; out of 
health care rendered or which should have been rendered by 
the health care provider. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-403(16) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Chad Nordgren's 
claim for loss of consortium fits squarely within the definition of "malpractice action 
against a health care provider"—a loss of consortium claim is a tort, based upon his 
alleged personal injuries for loss of society, comfort and protection, which arose out of 
health care rendered to Jennie Nordgren. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-403(16). 
Therefore, according to the plain language of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, the 
trial court properly held that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act applies to Chad 
Nordgren's loss of consortium claim. 
In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has already recognized that the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act applies to loss of consortium claims derived from medical malpractice 
injuries. See Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, n. 1, 1338 (Utah 1987). In Brower, 
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plaintiff and her husband sued her doctor and the hospital for injuries related to a 
puncture wound that she incurred during her hysterectomy. The Utah Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the husband's loss of consortium claim "[arose] out of the same 
negligent conduct" as plaintiffs claims and that the husband was required to file a notice 
of intent pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. See id. (citing Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-8 (1987) renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-412 (2008)). 
Despite the clear language of the Loss of Consortium Act, the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, and case law, Chad Nordgren argues that the trial court erred in holding 
that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act applied to his loss of consortium claim. See 
Appellant's Brief at 16-18. In the proceedings below, Mr. Nordgren argued that his loss 
of consortium claim constituted a third-party action, which he argued was expressly 
excluded from the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. (R. at 44); see Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-3-412(5). 
Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium claim, however, is not a third-party action. 
Utah case law defines a "third-party action" as an "action [that] is available only to assert 
a claim against 'a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to [a defendant] 
for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against [that defendant].'" Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, n.8 (Utah App. 1989) (citing Utah Civ. P. 14(a)). Because Mr. 
Nordgren is not a defendant seeking to recover from a non-party defendant, his claim for 
loss of consortium is not a third-party action. Accordingly, the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act applies to his loss of consortium claim against Defendants. 
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Mr. Nordgren also argues that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act does not 
apply to his loss of consortium claim because the health care in question was not 
provided to him personally. (R. at 127:13-15); see also Appellant's Brief at 17-18. 
Specifically, Mr. Nordgren argues that this Court should analyze his loss of consortium 
claim under the Dowling v. Bullen holding. 2002 UT App. 372, 58 P.3d 877. See 
Appellant's Brief at 18. Mr. Nordgren is mistaken. Dowling only analyzes a claim for 
alienation of affections, a direct tort. 2002 UT App. at f 3. It does not address a claim for 
loss of consortium, a derivative cause of action, that is statutorily defined by as a claim 
that is "subject to the same defenses, limitations, immunities, and provisions applicable to 
the claims of the injured person"' Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(b) (emphasis added); see 
also Hackford, 740 P.2d at 1290. Dowling, therefore, is not applicable to this matter and 
should not govern this analysis. 
Accordingly, pursuant to the plain language of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act and the Loss of Consortium Act, the trial court correctly held that the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act applies to Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium claim. Defendant 
Dr. Blomquist, therefore, respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the 
trial court on this basis. 
3
 Although Mr. Nordgren denied the applicability of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act to his loss of consortium claim in his Opposition Memorandum, this argument based 
upon Dowling v. Bullen, 2002 UT App. 372, 58 P.3d 877, was not fully briefed because 
Mr. Nordgren did not assert this argument until oral arguments on June 1, 2009. (R. at 44, 
127:13). Defendant, however, will address this argument herein. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly held that Plaintiff Chad Nordgren did not timely 
commence his loss of consortium claim by serving his notice of claim fifteen (15) months 
after his spouse, Jennie Nordgren, began pursuing her medical malpractice claim against 
Defendants by serving a notice of intent to commence action. Chad Nordgren's failure to 
timely commence his loss of consortium claim prejudiced Defendants, did not comply 
with the parameters of the Loss of Consortium Act, and frustrated the purposes of the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed Chad 
Nordgren's loss of consortium claim for his failure to abide by the Loss of Consortium 
Act and Dr. Blomquist respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's ruling. 
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Westlaw 
UCA 1953 §30-2-11 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Cunentness 
Title 30 Husband and Wife 
^y Chaptei 2 Property Rights 
-* § 30-2-11. Action for consortium due to personal injury 
(1) For purposes of this section 
(a) "injury" or "injured" means a significant permanent injury to a person that substantially changes that per-
son's lifestyle and includes the following 
(I) a partial or complete paralysis of one or more of the extremities, 
(n) significant disfigurement, or 
(in) incapability of the person of performing the types of jobs the person performed before the injury, and 
(b) 'spouse" means the legal relationship 
(l) established between a man and a woman as recognized by the laws of this state, and 
(n) existing at the time of the person's injury 
(2) The spouse of a person injured by a third party on or after May 4, 1997, may maintain an action against the 
third party to recover for loss of consortium 
(3) A claim for loss of consortium begins on the date of injury to the spouse The statute of limitations applic-
able to the injured person shall also apply to the spouse's claim of loss of consortium 
(4) A claim for the spouse's loss of consortium shall be 
(a) made at the time the claim of the injured person is made and joinder of actions shall be compulsory, and 
(b) subject to the same defenses, limitations, immunities, and provisions applicable to the claims of the injured 
person 
©2010 Thomson Reuters No Claim to Ong US Gov Works 
http //web2 westlaw com/print/printstream aspx?rs=WLW10 01 &destination=:atp&prft=:HT 2/5/2010 
Page 3 of 3 
U.C.A. 1953 §30-2-11 Page 2 
(5) The spouse's action for loss of consortium: 
(a) shall be derivative from the cause of action existing in behalf of the injured person; and 
(b) may not exisl in cases where the injured person would not have a cause of action. 
(6) Fault of the spouse of the injured person, as well as fault of the injured person, shall be compared with the 
fault of all other parties, pursuant to Sections 78B-5-817 through 78B-5-823, for purposes of reducing or barring 
any recovery by the spouse for loss of consortium. 
(7) Damages awarded for loss of consortium, when combined with any award to the injured person for general 
damages, may not exceed any applicable statutory limit on noneconomic damages, including Section 78B-3-410. 
(8) Damages awarded for loss of consortium which a governmental entity is required to pay, when combined 
with any award to the injured person which a governmental entity is required to pay, may not exceed the liability 
limit for one person in any one occurrence under Title 63G, Chapter 7, Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1997, c. 163, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2005, c. 102, § 9, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2008, c. 3, § 43, eff. 
Feb. 7,2008; Laws 2008. c. 382, § 331. eff. May 5, 2008. 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-14-1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
H^ Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
*M Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos) 
-* § 78B-3-40L Title 
This part shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Health Care Malpractice Act." 
CREDIT(S) 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-3-402 Page 1 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-14-2 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
*H Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
*ii Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos) 
-+ § 78B-3-402. Legislative findings and declarations—Purpose of act 
(1) The Legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for damages and the amount of judg-
ments and settlements arising from health care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these increases 
the insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of medical malpractice insurance. The effect of in-
creased insurance premiums and increased claims is increased health care cost, both through the health care pro-
viders passing the cost of premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing defensive medicine be-
cause he views a patient as a potential adversary in a lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are discour-
aged from continuing to provide services because of the high cost and possible unavailability of malpractice in-
surance. 
(2) In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the adverse effects which these trends are 
producing in the public's health care system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures 
designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide health-related malpractice insurance 
while at the same time establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of insurance in the event that it be-
comes unavailable from private companies. 
(3) In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the Legislature to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be 
commenced against health care providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which professional li-
ability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural 
changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims. 
CREDIT(S) 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-3-403 Page 1 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-14-3 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
"iii Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
*fi Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos) 
*+ § 78B-3-403. Definitions 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to practice audiology under Title 58, Chapter 41, Speech-language 
Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act. 
(2) "Certified social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a certified social worker under Section 
58-60-205. 
(3) "Chiropractic physician" means a person licensed to practice chiropractic under Title 58, Chapter 73, Chiro-
practic Physician Practice Act. 
(4) "Clinical social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a clinical social worker under Section 58-60-205. 
(5) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of insurance as provided in Section 31A-2-102. 
(6) "Dental hygienist" means a person licensed to engage in the practice of dental hygiene as defined in Section 
58-69-102. 
(7) "Dentist" means a person licensed to engage in the practice of dentistry as defined in Section 58-69-102. 
(8) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing created in Section 58-1-103. 
(9) "Future damages" includes a judgment creditor's damages for future medical treatment, care or custody, loss 
of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future pain and suffering. 
(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or 
furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treat-
ment, or confinement. 
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(11) "Health care facility" means general acute hospitals, specialty hospitals, home health agencies, hospices, 
nursing care facilities, assisted living facilities, birthing centers, ambulatory surgical facilities, small health care 
facilities, health care facilities owned or operated by health maintenance organizations, and end stage renal dis-
ease facilities. 
(12) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, association, corporation, or other facility or insti-
tution who causes to be rendered or who renders health care or professional services as a hospital, health care fa-
cility, physician, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife, licensed Direct-entry midwife, dent-
ist, dental hygienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical therapist, physical therap-
ist assistant, podiatric physician, psychologist, chiropractic physician, naturopathic physician, osteopathic physi-
cian, osteopathic physician and surgeon, audiologist, speech-language pathologist, clinical social worker, certi-
fied social worker, social service worker, marriage and family counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, or others ren-
dering similar care and services relating to or arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of persons and 
officers, employees., or agents of any of the above acting in the course and scope of their employment. 
(13) "Hospital" means a public or private institution licensed under Title 26, Chapter 21, Health Care Facility 
Licensing and Inspection Act. 
(14) "Licensed Direct-entry midwife" means a person licensed under the Direct-entry Midwife Act to engage in 
the practice of direct-entry midwifery as defined in Section 58-77-102. 
(15) "Licensed practical nurse" means a person licensed to practice as a licensed practical nurse as provided in 
Section 58-3 lb-301. 
(16) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any action against a health care provider, wheth-
er in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relat-
ing to or arising out of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care provider. 
(17) "Marriage and family therapist" means a person licensed to practice as a marriage therapist or family ther-
apist under Sections 58-60-305 and 58-60-405. 
(18) "Naturopathic physician" means a person licensed to engage in the practice of naturopathic medicine as 
defined in Section 58-71-102. 
(19) "Nurse-midwife" means a person licensed to engage in practice as a nurse midwife under Section 58-44a-301. 
(20) "Optometrist" means a person licensed to practice optometry under Title 58, Chapter 16a, Utah Optometry 
Practice Act. 
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(21) "Osteopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice osteopathy under Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah 
Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(22) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care provider, under a contract, express or im- plied. 
(23) "Periodic payments" means the payment of money or delivery of other property to a judgment creditor at 
intervals ordered by the court. 
(24) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to practice pharmacy as provided in Section 58-17b-301. 
(25) "Physical therapist" means a person licensed to practice physical therapy under Title 58, Chapter 24b, 
Physical Therapy Practice Act. 
(26) "Physical therapist assistant" means a person licensed to practice physical therapy, within the scope of a 
physical therapist assistant license, under Title 58, Chapter 24b, Physical Therapy Practice Act. 
(27) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice medicine and surgery under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah 
Medical Practice Act. 
(28) "Podiatric physician" means a person licensed to practice podiatry under Title 58, Chapter 5a, Podiatric 
Physician Licensing Act. 
(29) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a person licensed to practice as a physician in this state under Title 58, 
Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(30) "Psychologist" means a person licensed under Title 58, Chapter 61, Psychologist Licensing Act, to engage 
in the practice of psychology as defined in Section 58-61-102. 
(31) "Registered nurse" means a person licensed to practice professional nursing as provided in Section 58-3 ib-301. 
(32) "Relative" means a patient's spouse, parent, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, child, grandchild, brother, 
sister, half brother, half sister, or spouse's parents. The term includes relationships that are created as a result of 
adoption. 
(33) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, attorney-in-fact, person designated to make 
decisions on behalf of a patient under a medical power of attorney, or other legal agent of the patient. 
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(34) "Social sei vice worker" means a person licensed to practice as a social service vvoiker under Section 
58-60-205. 
(35) "Speech-language pathologist" means a person licensed to practice speech-language pathology under Title 
58, Chapter 41, Speech-language Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act. 
(36) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or unlawful act or omission proximately caus-
ing injury or damage to another. 
(37) "Unanticipated outcome" means the outcome of a medical treatment or procedure that differs from an ex-
pected result. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
KM Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
*ii Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos) 
-f § 78B-3-404. Statute of limitations—Exceptions—Application 
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider shall be commenced within two years after the plaintiff 
or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever 
first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1): 
(a) in an action where the allegation against the health care provider is that a foreign object has been wrong-
fully left within a patient's body, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence 
of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever first occurs; or 
(b) in an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part 
of a health care provider because that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the 
alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, 
whichever first occurs. 
(3) The limitations in this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability under 
Section 78B-2-108 or any other provision of the law. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
KM Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
*S Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Rets & Annos) 
-t § 78B-3-405. Amount of award reduced by amounts of collateral sources available to plaintiff-
-No reduction where subrogation right exists—Collateral sources defined—Procedure to preserve 
subrogation rights—Evidence admissible—Exceptions 
(1) In all malpractice actions against health care providers as defined in Section 78B-3-403 in which damages 
are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for losses sustained, the court shall reduce the amount of the award by 
the total of all amounts paid to the plaintiff from all collateral sources which are available to him. No reduction 
may be made for collateral sources for which a subrogation right exists as provided in this section nor shall there 
be a reduction for any collateral payment not included in the award of damages. 
(2) Upon a finding of liability and an awarding of damages by the trier of fact, the court shall receive evidence 
concerning the total amounts of collateral sources which have been paid to or for the benefit of the plaintiff or 
are otherwise available to him. The court shall also take testimony of any amount which has been paid, contrib-
uted, or forfeited by. or on behalf of the plaintiff or members of his immediate family to secure his right to any 
collateral source benefit which he is receiving as a result of his injury, and shall offset any reduction in the 
award by those amounts. Evidence may not be received and a reduction may not be made with respect to future 
collateral source benefits except as specified in Subsection (5). 
(3) For purposes of this section "collateral source" means payments made to or for the benefit of the plaintiff for: 
(a) medical expenses and disability payments payable under the United States Social Security Act, any feder-
al, state, or local income disability act, or any other public program, except the federal programs which are re-
quired by law to seek subrogation; 
(b) any health, sickness, or income replacement insurance, automobile accident insurance that provides health 
benefits or income replacement coverage, and any other similar insurance benefits, except life insurance bene-
fits available to the plaintiff, whether purchased by the plaintiff or provided by others; 
(c) any contract or agreement of any person, group, organization, partnership, or corporation to provide, pay 
for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or other health care services, except benefits received 
as gifts, contributions, or assistance made gratuitously; and 
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(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers or any other system intended 
to provide wages during a period of disability. 
(4) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts paid or received prior to settlement or judgment, a provider of 
collateral sources shall, at least 30 days before settlement or trial of the action, serve a written notice upon each 
health care provider against whom the malpractice action has been asserted. The written notice shall state: 
(a) the name and address of the provider of collateral sources; 
(b) the amount of collateral sources paid; 
(c) the names and addresses of all persons who received payment; and 
(d) the items and purposes for which payment has been made. 
(5) Evidence is admissible of government programs that provide payments or benefits available in the future to 
or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the extent available irrespective of the recipient's ability to pay. Evidence of 
the likelihood or unlikelihood that the programs, payments, or benefits will be available in the future is also ad-
missible. The trier of fact may consider the evidence in determining the amount of damages awarded to a 
plaintiff for future expenses. 
(6) A provider of collateral sources is not entitled to recover any amount of benefits from a health care provider, 
the plaintiff, or any other person or entity as reimbursement for collateral source payments made prior to settle-
ment or judgment, including any payments made under Title 26, Chapter 19, Medical Benefits Recovery Act, 
except to the extent that subrogation rights to amounts paid prior to settlement or judgment are preserved as 
provided in this section. 
(7) All policies of insurance providing benefits affected by this section are construed in accordance with this section. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
*M Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
*y Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos) 
-• § 78B-3-406. Failure to obtain informed consent—Proof required of patient—Defenses—Consent 
to health care 
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered by a health care provider, it is presumed that actions taken by 
the health care provider are either expressly or impliedly authorized to be done. For a patient to recover damages 
from a health care provider in an action based upon the provider's failure to obtain informed consent, the patient 
must prove the following: 
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed between the patient and health care provider; 
(b) the health care provider rendered health care to the patient; 
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health care rendered; 
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and significant risk of causing the patient serious harm; 
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and significant risk; 
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not have consented to the health care rendered 
after having been fully informed as to all facts relevant to the decision to give consent; and 
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care rendered was the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by 
the patient. 
(2) In determining what a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would do under the circumstances, 
the finder of fact shall use the viewpoint of the patient before health care was provided and before the occur-
rence of any personal injuries alleged to have arisen from said health care. 
(3) It shall be a defense to any malpractice action against a health care provider based upon alleged failure to ob-
tain informed consent if: 
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(a) the risk of the serious harm which the patient actually suffered was relatively minor; 
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from the health care provider was commonly known to the public; 
(c) the patient stated, prior to receiving the health care complained of, that he would accept the health care in-
volved regardless of the risk; or that he did not want to be informed of the matters to which he would be en-
titled to be informed; 
(d) the health care provider, after considering all of the attendant facts and circumstances, used reasonable dis-
cretion as to the manner and extent to which risks were disclosed, if the health care provider reasonably be-
lieved that additional disclosures could be expected to have a substantial and adverse effect on the patient's 
condition; or 
(e) the patient or his representative executed a written consent which sets forth the nature and purpose of the 
intended health care and which contains a declaration that the patient accepts the risk of substantial and seri-
ous harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of health care and which acknowledges that 
health care providers involved have explained his condition and the proposed health care in a satisfactory 
manner and that all questions asked about the health care and its attendant risks have been answered in a man-
ner satisfactory to the patient or his representative. 
(4) The written consent shall be a defense to an action against a health care provider based upon failure to obtain 
informed consent unless the patient proves that the person giving the consent lacked capacity to consent or 
shows by clear and convincing evidence that the execution of the written consent was induced by the defendant's 
affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state material facts. 
(5) This act may not be construed to prevent any person 18 years of age or over from refusing to consent to 
health care for his own person upon personal or religious grounds. 
(6) Except as provided in Section 76-7-304.5, the following persons are authorized and empowered to consent to 
any health care not prohibited by law: 
(a) any parent, whether an adult or a minor, for the parent's minor child; 
(b) any married person, for a spouse; 
(c) any person temporarily standing in loco parentis, whether formally serving or not, for the minor under that 
person's care and any guardian for the guardian's ward; 
(d) any person 18 years of age or over for that person's parent who is unable by reason of age, physical or 
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mental condition, to provide such consent; 
(e) any patient 18 years of age or over; 
(f) any female regardless of age or marital status, when given in connection with her pregnancy or childbirth; 
(g) in the absence of a parent, any adult for the adult's minor brother or sister; and 
(h) in the absence of a parent, any grandparent for the grandparent's minor grandchild. 
(7) A person who in good faith consents or authorizes health care treatment or procedures for another as 
provided by this act may not be subject to civil liability. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
*y Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
*il Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos) 
•sf § 78B-3-407. Limitation on actions against health care providers when parent or guardian re-
fuses to consent to health care of child 
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider may not be brought on the basis of the consequences res-
ulting from the refusal of a child's parent or guardian to consent to the child's health care, if: 
(a) the health care is recommended by the health care provider; 
(b) the parent or guardian is provided with sufficient information to make an informed decision regarding the 
lecQminejydation ofthehzatih care proy'idtr; and 
(c) the consent of the parent or guardian is required by law before the health care may be administered. 
(2) The sole purpose of this section is to prohibit a malpractice action against a health care provider under the 
circumstances set forth by this section. This section may not be construed to: 
(a) create a new cause of action; 
(b) expand an existing cause of action; 
(c) impose a new duty on a health care provider; or 
(d) expand an existing duty of a health care provider. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
*(i Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
*g Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos) 
*> § 78B-3-408. Writing required as basis for liability for breach of guarantee, warranty, con-
tract, or assurance of result 
Liability may not be imposed upon any health care provider on the basis of an alleged breach of guarantee, war-
ranty, contract, or assurance of result to be obtained from any health c#re rendered unless the guarantee, war-
ranty, contract, or assurance is set forth in writing and signed by the health care provider or an authorized agent 
of the provider. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
KM Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
*M Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos) 
.+ § 78B-3-409. Ad damnum clause prohibited in complaint 
A dollar amount may not be specified in the prayer of a complaint filed in a malpractice action against a health 
care provider. The complaint shall merely pray for such damages as are reasonable in the circumstances. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
*y Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
*li Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Armos) 
-f § 78B-3-410. Limitation of award of noneconomic damages in malpractice actions 
(1) In a malpractice action_against a health care provider, an injured plaintiff may recover noneconomic losses to 
compensate for pain, suffering, and inconvenience. The amount of damages awarded for noneconomic loss may 
not exceed: 
(a) for a cause of action arising before July 1, 2001, $250,000; 
(b) for a cause of action arising on or after July 1, 2001 and before July 1, 2002, the limitation is adjusted for 
inflation to $400,000; and 
(c) for a cause of action arising on or after July 1, 2002, the $400,000 limitation described in Subsection (l)(b) 
shall be adjusted for inflation as provided in Subsection (2). 
(2)(a) Beginning July 1, 2002 and each July 1 thereafter, the limit for damages under Subsection (l)(c) shall be 
adjusted for inflation by the state treasurer.' 
(b) By July 15 of each year, the state treasurer shall: 
(i) certify the inflation-adjusted limit calculated under this Subsection (2); and 
(ii) inform the Administrative Office of the Courts of the certified limit. 
(c) The amount resulting from Subsection (2)(a) shall: 
(i) be rounded to the nearest $10,000; and 
(ii) apply to a cause of action arising on or after the date the annual adjustment is made. 
(3) As used in this section, "inflation" means the seasonally adjusted consumer price index for all urban con-
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sumers as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Depaitment of Labor. 
(4) The limit under Subsection (1) does not apply to awards of punitive damages. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
KM Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
KM Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos) 
-f § 78B-3-411. Limitation on attorney's contingency fee in malpractice action 
(1) In any malpractice action against a health care provider as defined in Section 78B-3-403, an attorney may 
not collect a contingent fee for representing a client seeking damages in connection with or arising out of per-
sonal injury or wrongful death caused by the negligence of another which exceeds 33-1/3% of the amount re-
covered. 
(2) This limitation applies regardless of whether the recovery is by settlement, arbitration, judgment, or whether 
appeal is involved. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
K\g Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
*li Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Amios) 
-• § 78B-3-412. Notice of intent to commence action 
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider may not be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives 
the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at least 90 days' prior notice of intent to commence an action. 
(2) The notice shall include: 
(a) a general statement of the nature of the claim; 
(b) the persons involved; 
(c) the date, time, and place of the occurrence; 
(d) the circumstances surrounding the claim; 
(e) specific allegations of misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant; and 
(f) the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages sustained. 
(3) Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his attorney. Service shall be accom-
plished by persons authorized and in the manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service 
of the summons and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt requested, in which case no-
tice shall be considered served on the date of mailing. 
(4) Notice shall be served within the time allowed for commencing a malpractice action against a health care 
provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable time period, the 
time for commencing the malpractice action against the health care provider shall be extended to 120 days from 
the date of service of notice. 
(5) This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed as relating to the limitation 
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on the time for commencing any action, and shall apply only to causes of action aiising on or after April 1, 
1976. This section shall not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a health care pro-
vider. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
K\g Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
K\g Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Rets & Annos) 
-4- § 78B-3-413. Professional liability insurance coverage for providers-Insurance commissioner 
may require joint underwriting authority 
(1) The commissioner may, after a public hearing, find that professional liability insurance coverage for health 
care providers is not readily available in the voluntary market in a specific part of this state, and that the public 
interest requires that action be taken. 
(2) The commissioner may promulgate rules and implement plans to provide insurance coverage through all in-
surers issuing professional liability policies and individual and group accident and sickness policies providing 
medical, surgical or hospital expense coverage on either a prepaid or an expense incurred basis, including per-
sonal injury protection and medical expense coverage issued incidental to liability insurance policies. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
K\g Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
*i§| Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos) 
-* § 78B-3-414. Periodic payment of future damages in malpractice actions 
(1) In any malpractice action against a health care provider, as defined in Section 78B-3-403, the court shall, at 
the request of any party, order that future damages which equal or exceed $100,000, less amounts payable for at-
torney fees and other costs which are due at the time of judgment, shall be paid by periodic payments rather than 
by a lump sum payment. 
(2) In rendering a judgment which orders the payment of future damages by periodic payments, the court shall 
order periodic payments to provide a fair correlation between the sustaining of losses and the payment of dam- ages. 
(a) Lost future earnings shall be paid over the judgment creditor's work life expectancy. 
(b) The court shall also order, when appropriate, that periodic payments increase at a fixed rate, equal to the 
rate of inflation v/hich the finder of fact used to determine the amount of future damages, or as measured by 
the most recent Consumer Price Index applicable to Utah for all goods and services. 
(c) The present cash value of all periodic payments shall equal the fact finder's award of future damages, less 
any amount paid for attorney fees and costs. 
(d) The present cash value of periodic payments shall be determined by discounting the total amount of peri-
odic payments projected over the judgment creditor's life expectancy, by the rate of interest which the finder 
of fact used to reduce the amount of future damages to present value, or the rate of interest available at the 
time of trial on one year U.S. Government Treasury Bills. 
(3) Before periodic payments of future damages may be ordered, the court shall require a judgment debtor to 
post security which assures full payment of those damages. Security for payment of a judgment of periodic pay-
ments may be in one or more of the following forms: 
(a) a bond executed by a qualified insurer; 
(b) an annuity contract executed by a qualified insurer; 
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(c) evidence of applicable and collectable liability insurance with one or more qualified insurers; 
(d) an agreement by one or more qualified insurers to guarantee payment of the judgment; or 
(e) any other form of security approved by the court. 
(4) Security which complies with this section may also serve as a supersedeas bond, where one is required. 
(5) A judgment which orders payment of future damages by periodic payments shall specify the recipient or re-
cipients of the payments, the dollar amount of the payments, the interval between payments, and the number of 
payments or the period of time over which payments shall be made. Those payments may only be modified in 
the event of the death of the judgment creditor. 
(6) If the court finds that the judgment debtor, or the assignee of his obligation to make periodic payments, has 
failed to make periodic payments as ordered by the court, it shall, in addition to the required periodic payments, 
order the judgment debtor or his assignee to pay the judgment creditor all damages caused by the failure to make 
payments, including court costs and attorney fees. 
(7) The obligation to make periodic payments for all future damages, other than damages for loss of future earn-
ings, shall cease upon the death of the judgment creditor. Damages awarded for loss of future earnings may not 
be reduced or payments terminated by reason of the death of the judgment creditor, but shall be paid to persons 
to whom the judgment creditor owed a duty of support, as provided by law, immediately prior to his death. In 
that case the court which rendered the original judgment may, upon petition of any party in interest, modify the 
judgment to award and apportion the unpaid future damages in accordance with this section.' 
(8) If security is posted in accordance with Subsection (3), and approved by a final judgment entered under this 
section, the judgment is considered to be satisfied, and the judgment debtor on whose behalf the security is pos-
ted shall be discharged. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
KM Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
*® Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos) 
-* § 78B-3-415. Actions under Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
The provisions of this part shall apply to malpractice actions against health care providers which are brought un-
der the Utah Governmental Immunity Act if applicable. This part may not affect the requirements for filing no-
tices of claims, times for commencing actions and limitations on amounts recoverable under the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act. 
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Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-14-12 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
*M Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
K® Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos) 
-f § 78B-3-416. Division to provide panel—Exemption—Procedures—Statute of limitations tolled-
-Composition of panel—Expenses—Division authorized to set license fees 
(l)(a) The division shall provide a hearing panel in alleged medical liability cases against health care providers 
as defined in Section 78B-3-403, except dentists. 
(b)(i) The division shall establish procedures for prelitigation consideration of medical liability claims for 
damages arising out of the provision of or alleged failure to provide health care. 
(ii) The division may establish rules necessary to administer the process and procedures related to prelitiga-
tion hearings and the conduct of prelitigation hearings in accordance with Sections 78B-3-416 through 
78B-3-420. 
(c) The proceedings are informal, nonbinding, and are not subject to Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Pro-
cedures Act, but are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation. 
(d) Proceedings conducted under authority of this section are confidential, privileged, and immune from civil 
process. 
(2)(a) The party initiating a medical liability action shall file a request for prelitigation panel review with the di-
vision within 60 days after the service of a statutory notice of intent to commence action under Section 78B-3-412. 
(b) The request shall include a copy of the notice of intent to commence action. The request shall be mailed to 
all health care providers named in the notice and request. 
(3)(a) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this section tolls the applicable statute of limit-
ations until the earlier of 60 days following the division's issuance of an opinion by the prelitigation panel, or 60 
days following the termination of jurisdiction by the division as provided in this subsection. The division shall 
send any opinion issued by the panel to all parties by regular mail. 
(b)(i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hearing under this section within 180 days after the filing of 
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the request for prelitigation panel review, or within any longer period as agreed upon in writing by all parties 
to the review. 
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been completed within the time limits established in Subsection 
(3)(b)(i), the division has no further jurisdiction over the matter subject to review and the claimant is con-
sidered to have complied with all conditions precedent required under this section prior to the commence-
ment of litigation. 
(c)(i) The claimant and any respondent may agree by written stipulation that no useful purpose would be 
served by convening a prelitigation panel under this section. 
(ii) When the stipulation is filed with the division, the division shall within ten days after receipt enter an 
order divesting itself of jurisdiction over the claim, as it concerns the stipulating respondent, and stating that 
the claimant has complied with all conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation regarding the claim. 
(4) The division shall provide for and appoint an appropriate panel or panels to hear complaints of medical liab-
ility and damages, made by or on behalf of any patient who is an alleged victim of medical liability. The panels 
are composed of: 
(a) one member who is a resident lawyer currently licensed and in good standing to practice law in this state 
and who shall serve as chairman of the panel, who is appointed by the division from among qualified individu-
als who have registered with the division indicating a willingness to serve as panel members, and a willing-
ness to comply with the rules of professional conduct governing lawyers in the state of Utah, and who has 
completed division training regarding conduct of panel hearings; 
(b)(i) one member who is a licensed health care provider listed under Section 78B-3-403, who is practicing 
and knowledgeable in the same specialty as the proposed defendant, and who is appointed by the division in 
accordance with Subsection (5); or 
(ii) in claims against only hospitals or their employees, one member who is an individual currently serving 
in a hospital administration position directly related to hospital operations or conduct that includes respons-
ibility for the area of practice that is the subject of the liability claim, and who is appointed by the division; and 
(c) a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor, hospital employee, or other health care provider, and who is a 
responsible citizen of the state, selected and appointed by the division from among individuals who have com-
pleted division training with respect to panel hearings. 
(5)(a) Each person listed as a health care provider in Section 78B-3-403 and practicing under a license issued by 
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the state, is obligated as a condition of holding that license to participate as a member of a medical liability prel-
itigation panel at reasonable times, places, and intervals, upon issuance, with advance notice given in a reason-
able time frame, by the division of an Order to Participate as a Medical Liability Prelitigation Panel Member. 
(b) A licensee may be excused from appearance and participation as a panel member upon the division finding 
participation by the licensee will create an unreasonable burden or hardship upon the licensee. 
(c) A licensee whom the division finds failed to appear and participate as a panel member when so ordered, 
without adequate explanation or justification and without being excused for cause by the division, may be as-
sessed an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000. 
(d) A licensee whom the division finds intentionally or repeatedly failed to appear and participate as a panel 
member when so ordered, without adequate explanation or justification and without being excused for cause 
by the division, may be assessed an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000, and is guilty of unprofessional 
conduct. 
(e) All fines collected under Subsections (5)(c) and (d) shall be deposited in the Physicians Education Fund 
created in Section 58-67a-l. 
(6) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify, under oath, that he has no bias or conflict of interest 
with respect to any matter under consideration. 
(7) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels shall receive per diem compensation and travel expenses for at-
tending panel hearings as established by rules of the division. 
(8)(a) In addition to the actual cost of administering the licensure of health care providers, the division may set 
license fees of health care providers within the limits established by law equal to their proportionate costs of ad-
ministering prelitigation panels. 
(b) The claimant bears none of the costs of administering the prelitigation panel except under Section 78B-3-420. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
*ii Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
*di Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos) 
-+ § 78B-3-417. Proceedings—Authority of panel—Rights of parties to proceedings 
(1) No record of the proceedings is required and all evidence, documents, and exhibits are returned to the parties 
or witnesses who provided the evidence, documents, and exhibits at the end of the proceedings upon the request 
of the parties or witnesses who provided the evidence. 
(2) The division may issue subpoenas for medical records directly related to the claim of medical liability in ac-
cordance with division rule and in compliance with the following: 
(a) the subpoena shall be prepared by the requesting party in proper form for issuance by the division; and 
(b) the subpoena shall be accompanied by: 
(i) an affidavit prepared by the person requesting the subpoena attesting to the fact the medical record sub-
ject to subpoena is believed to be directly related to the medical liability claim to which the subpoena is re-
lated; or 
(ii) by a written release for the medical records to be provided to the person requesting the subpoena, signed 
by the individual who is the subject of the medical record or by that individual's guardian or conservator. 
(3) Per diem reimbursement to panel members and expenses incurred by the panel in the conduct of prelitigation 
panel hearings shall be paid by the division. Expenses related to subpoenas are paid by the requesting party, in-
cluding witness fees and mileage. 
(4) The proceedings are informal and formal rules of evidence are not applicable. There is no discovery or per-
petuation of testimony in the proceedings, except upon special order of the panel, and for good cause shown 
demonstrating extraordinary circumstances. 
(5)(a) A party is entitled to attend, personally or with counsel, and participate in the proceedings, except upon 
special order of the panel and unanimous agreement of the parties. The proceedings are confidential and closed 
to the public. 
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(b)No party has the right to cross-examine, rebut, or demand that customary formalities of civil trials and 
court proceedings be followed. The panel may, however, request special or supplemental participation of some 
or all parties in particular respects. 
(c) Communications between the panel and the parties, except the testimony of the parties on the merits of the 
dispute, are disclosed to all other parties. 
(6) The division shall appoint a panel to consider the claim and set the matter for panel review as soon as prac-
ticable after receipt of a request. 
(7) Parties may be represented by counsel in proceedings before a panel. 
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Title 78B. Judicial Code 
*H Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
*j§ Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos) 
-f § 78B-3-418. Decision and recommendations of panel—No judicial or other review 
The panel shall render its opinion in writing not later than 30 days after the end of the proceedings. The panel 
shall determine on the basis of the evidence whether each claim against each health care provider has merit or 
has no merit and, if meritorious, whether the conduct complained of resulted in harm to the claimant. 
There is no judicial or other review or appeal of the panel's decision or recommendations. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
KM Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
K
m Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs &, Annos) 
-* § 78B-3-419. Evidence of proceedings not admissible in subsequent action—Panelist may not be 
compelled to testify—Immunity of panelist from civil liability—Information regarding professional 
conduct 
(1) Evidence of the proceedings conducted by the medical review panel and its results, opinions, findings, and 
determinations are not admissible as evidence in an action subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
(2) No panelist may be compelled to testify in a civil action subsequently filed with regard to the subject matter 
of the panel's review. A panelist has immunity from civil liability arising from participation as a panelist and for 
all communications, findings, opinions, and conclusions made in the course and scope of duties prescribed by 
this section. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to prohibit the division from considering any information con-
tained in a statutory notice of intent to commence action, request for prelitigation panel review, or written find-
ings of a panel with respect to the division's determining whether a licensee engaged in unprofessional or unlaw-
ful conduct. 
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Title 78B. Judicial Code 
*H Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
K
m Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs &. Annos) 
-* § 78B-3-420. Proceedings considered a binding arbitration hearing upon written agreement of 
parties—Compensation to members of panel 
Upon written agreement by all parties, the proceeding may be considered a binding arbitration hearing and pro-
ceed under Title 78B, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, except for the selection of the panel, which is 
done as set forth in Subsection 78B-3-416(4). If the proceeding is considered an arbitration proceeding, the 
parties are equally responsible for compensation to the members of the panel for services rendered. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Cuirentness 
Title 78B Judicial Code 
KB Chaptei 3 Actions and Venue 
KQ Part 4 Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Rets & Annos) 
-+ § 78B-3-421. Arbitration agreements 
(1) After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient and a health care provider to be 
validly executed oi, if the requirements of this Subsection (1) have not been previously met on at least one occa-
sion, renewed 
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing, the following information on 
(i) the requirement that the patient must arbitrate a claim instead of having the claim heard by a judge or jury, 
(n) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in which arbitrators are selected under the agreement, 
(in) the patient's responsibility, if any, for arbitration-related costs under the agreement, 
(IV) the right of the patient to decline to enter into the agreement and still receive health caie if Subsection 
(3) applies, 
(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each year unless the agreement is canceled in writing before the 
renewal date, 
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about the arbitration agreement answered, 
(vn) the right of the patient to rescind the agreement within ten days of signing the agreement, and 
(vm) the right of the patient to require mediation of the dispute prior to the arbitration of the dispute, 
(b) the agreement shall require that 
(l) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b)(n), a panel of three arbitrators shall be selected as follows 
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(A) one arbitrator collectively selected by all persons claiming damages; 
(B) one arbitrator selected by the health care provider; and 
(C) a third arbitrator: 
(I) jointly selected by all persons claiming damages and the health care provider; or 
(II) if both parties cannot agree on the selection of the third arbitrator, the other two arbitrators shall ap-
point the third arbitrator from a list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the state or federal courts 
of Utah; or 
(ii) if both parties agree, a single arbitrator may be selected; 
(iii) all parties waive the requirement of Section 78B-3-416 to appear before a hearing panel in a malprac-
tice action against a health care provider; 
(iv) the patient be given the right to rescind the agreement within ten days of signing the agreement; 
(v) the term of the agreement be for one year and that the agreement be automatically renewed each year un-
less the agreement is canceled in writing by the patient or_health care provider before the renewal date; 
(vi) the patient has the right to retain legal counsel; 
(vii) the agreement only apply to: 
(A) an error or omission that occurred after the agreement was signed, provided that the agreement may 
allow a person who would be a proper party in court to participate in an arbitration proceeding; 
(B) the claim of: 
(I) a person who signed the agreement; 
(II) a person on whose behalf the agreement was signed under Subsection (6); and 
(III) the unborn child of the person described in this Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B), for 12 months from the 
date the agreement is signed; and 
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(C) the claim of a person who is not a party to the contract if the sole basis for the claim is an injury sus-
tained by a person described in Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B); and 
(c) the patient shall be verbally encouraged to: 
(i) read the written information required by Subsection (l)(a) and the arbitration agreement; and 
(ii) ask any questions. 
(2) When a medical malpractice action is arbitrated, the action shall: 
(a) be subject to Chapter 31 a, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act; and 
(b) include any one or more of the following when requested by the patient before an arbitration hearing is 
commenced: 
(i) mandatory mediation; 
(ii) retention of the jointly selected arbitrator for both the liability and damages stages of an arbitration pro-
ceeding if the arbitration is bifurcated; and 
(iii) the filing of the panel's award of damages as a judgement against the provider in the appropriate district 
court. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a patient may not be denied health care on the sole basis that the patient or a 
person described in Subsection (6) refused to enter into a binding arbitration agreement with a health care pro- vider. 
(4) A written acknowledgment of having received a written explanation of a binding arbitration agreement 
signed by or on behalf of the patient shall be a defense to a claim that the patient did not receive a written ex-
planation of the agreement as required by Subsection (1) unless the patient: 
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement lacked the capacity to do so; or 
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the execution of the agreement was induced by the health 
care provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state material facts. 
(5) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim governed by a binding arbitration agreement that 
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was executed or renewed before May 3, 1999. 
(6) A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection 78B-3-406(6), except a person temporarily standing in 
loco parentis, may execute or rescind a binding arbitration agreement on behalf of a patient. 
(7) This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement that is subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 
U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq. 
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^ii Chapter 3. Actions and Venue 
*g Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos) 
-f § 78B-3-422. Evidence of disclosures-Civil proceedings-Unanticipated outcomes—Medical care 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Defendant" means the defendant in a malpractice action against a health care provider. 
(b) "Health care provider" includes an agent of a health care provider. 
(c) "Patient" includes any person associated with the patient. 
(2) In any civil action or arbitration proceeding relating to an unanticipated outcome of medical care, any un-
sworn statement, affirmation, gesture, or conduct made to the patient by the defendant shall be inadmissible as 
evidence of an admission against interest or of liability if it: 
(a) expresses: 
(i) apology, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, or compassion; or 
(ii) a general sense of benevolence; or 
(b) describes: 
(i) the sequence of events relating to the unanticipated outcome of medical care; 
(ii) the significance of events; or 
(iii) both. 
(3) Except as provided in Subsection (2), this section does not alter any other law or rule that applies to the ad-
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missibility of evidence in a medical malpractice action. 
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